Archive for the ‘Rise of Democracy’ Category

Excerpts from Jackson’s proclamation on Nullification

Thanks to Yale University’s Avalon Project….

Written in response to the Nullification Crisis of 1837:

As you read, consider these questions: What specific charges does Jackson make against South Carolina? What point does he make regarding the idea of nullification and the failed government under the Articles of Confederation? What previous examples does he use to show the impact of the theory of nullification had it been applied in the past?

Are there any examples of nullification theory still being promoted currently in the state of Missouri?

Whereas a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, have passed an ordinance, by which they declare that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and more especially “two acts for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law,” nor binding on the citizens of that State or its officers, and by the said ordinance it is further declared to he unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State, or of the United States, to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinances:

And whereas, by the said ordinance it is further ordained, that, in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any person attempting to take such appeal, shall be punished as for a contempt of court:

And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard, and that they will consider the passage of any act by Congress abolishing or closing the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do.

And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its Constitution, and having for its object the instruction of the Union-that Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and common cause, through the sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence-that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equaled in the history of nations; to preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the Convention.

Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be, invested, for preserving the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrances, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.

The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution- that they may do this consistently with the Constitution-that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as constitutional. It is true they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the Constitution, but it is evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress-one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory; and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous, when our social compact in express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and for greater caution adds, “that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” And it may be asserted, without fear of refutation, that no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look, for a moment, to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected anywhere; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself, for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.

If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but, fortunately, none of those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the States, who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our Constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State will, unfortunately, fall the evils of reducing it to practice.

If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in our Government.

In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were formed for common defense, and before the Declaration of Independence, we were known in our aggregate character as the United Colonies of America. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would, collectively, form one nation, for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union, is found an article which declares that “every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions which by that Confederation should be submitted to them.”

Under the Confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution, but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with. The Government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.

But the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy Constitution was formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it.

The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is “to form a more perfect Union.” Now, is it possible that, even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the Constitution and laws of the United States over those of the States, it can be conceived that an Instrument made for the purpose of “forming; a more perfect Union” than that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government, dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man, of plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.

I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which It was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.

 

The full text can be found here: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jack01.asp

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Excellent Review of Jackson’s Presidency and Impact

Go here: http://www.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/alife/defender_union.html

There is a great summary on the page to which I linked, as well as other resources that you should examine. His presidency is considered to be a pivotal time in American expansion and politics.

The South Carolina Exposition

As John C. Calhoun was Vice President in 1828, he could not openly oppose actions of the administration. Yet he was moving more and more toward the states’ rights position which in 1832 would lead to nullification. He drafted this protest against the Tariff of 1828, the so-called “Tariff of Abominations.”

South Carolina’s Exposition Against the Tariff of 1828
By John C. Calhoun (Anonymously)

The committee [of the South Carolina Legislature] have bestowed on the subjects referred to them the deliberate attention which their importance demands; and the result, on full investigation, is a unanimous opinion that the act of Congress of the last session, with the whole system of legislation imposing duties on imports, not for revenue, but the protection of one branch of industry at the expense of others, is unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, and calculated to corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of the country; which propositions they propose to consider in the order stated, and then to conclude their report with the consideration of the important question of the remedy.

The committee do not propose to enter into an elaborate or refined argument on the question of the constitutionality of the Tariff system. The General Government is one of specific powers, and it can rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted, and those that may be necessary and proper to carry them into effect, all others being reserved expressly to the States or the people. It results, necessarily, that those who claim to exercise power under the Constitution, are bound to show that it is expressly granted, or that it is necessary and proper as a means of the granted powers. The advocates of the Tariff have offered no such proof. It is true that the third section of the first article of the Constitution authorizes Congress to lay and collect an impost duty, but it is granted as a tax power for the sole purpose of revenue, a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or prohibitory duties. Their objects are incompatible. The prohibitory system must end in destroying the revenue from imports. It has been said that the system is a violation of the spirit, and not the letter of the Constitution. The distinction is not material. The Constitution may be as grossly violated by acting against its meaning as against its letter; but it may be proper to dwell a moment on the point in order to understand more fully the real character of the acts under which the interest of this, and other States similarly situated, has been sacrificed. The facts are few and simple. The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on imports for revenue, which power is abused by being converted into an instrument of rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another. The violation, then, consists in using a power granted for one object to advance another, and that by the sacrifice of the original object. It is, in a word, a violation by perversion, the most dangerous of all because the most insidious and difficult to resist. Others cannot be perpetrated without the aid of the judiciary; this may be by the Executive and Legislative departments alone. The courts cannot look into the motives of legislators. They are obliged to take acts by their titles and professed objects, and if these be constitutional, they cannot interpose their power, however grossly the acts may, in reality, violate the Constitution. The proceedings of the last session sufficiently prove that the House of Representatives are aware of the distinction, and determined to avail themselves of its advantage. . . .

On entering on this branch of the subject [the inequality and oppression of the Tariff system], the committee feel the painful character of the duty which they must perform. They would desire never to speak of our country, as far as the action of the General Government is concerned, but as one great whole, having a common interest, which all the parts ought zealously to promote. Previously to the adoption of the Tariff system, such was the unanimous feeling of this State; but in speaking of its operation, it will be impossible to avoid the discussion of sectional interest, and the use of sectional language. On its authors, and not on us, who are compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, by injustice and oppression, be the censure.

So partial are the effects of the system, that its burdens are exclusively on one side and its benefits on the other. It imposes on the agricultural interest of the South, including the Southwest, and that portion of the country particularly engaged in commerce and navigation, the burden not only of sustaining the system itself, but that also of the Government. In stating the case thus strongly, it is not the intention of the committee to exaggerate. If exaggeration were not unworthy of the gravity of the subject, the reality is such as to make it unnecessary….

We are the serfs of the system, out of whose labor is raised, not only the money paid into the Treasury, but the funds out of which are drawn the rich rewards of the manufacturer and his associates in interest. Their encouragement is our discouragement. The duty on imports, which is mainly paid out of our labor, gives them the means of selling to us at a higher price; while we cannot, to compensate the loss, dispose of our products at the least advance. It is then, indeed, not a subject of wonder, when understood, that our section of the country, though helped by a kind Providence with a genial sun and prolific soil, from which spring the richest products, should languish in poverty and sink into decay, while the rest of the Union, though less fortunate in natural advantages, are flourishing in unexampled prosperity. The assertion, that the encouragement of the industry of the manufacturing States is, in fact, discouragement to ours, was not made without due deliberation. It is susceptible of the clearest proof. We cultivate certain great staples for the supply of the general market of the world: They manufacture almost exclusively for the home market. Their object in the Tariff is to keep down foreign competition, in order to obtain a monopoly of the domestic market. The effect on us is, to compel us to purchase at a higher price, both what we obtain from them and from others, without receiving a correspondent increase in the price of what we sell. The price at which we can afford to cultivate must depend on the price at which we receive our supplies. The lower the latter, the lower we may dispose of our products with profit, and in the same degree our capacity of meeting competition is increased; and, on the contrary, the higher the price of our supplies, the less the profit, and the less, consequently, the capacity for meeting competition. . . .

The case, then, fairly stated between us and the manufacturing States is, that the Tariff gives them a protection against foreign competition in our own market, by diminishing, in the same proportion, our capacity to compete with our rivals, in the general market of the world….

The committee having presented its views on the partial and oppressive operation of the system, will proceed to discuss the next position which they proposed, its tendency to corrupt the Government, and to destroy the liberty of the country.

If there be a political proposition universally true, one which springs directly from the nature of man, and is independent of circumstances, it is, that irresponsible power is inconsistent with liberty, and must corrupt those who exercise it. On this great principle our political system rests. We consider all powers as delegated by the people, and to be controlled by them, who are interested in their just and proper exercise; and our Governments, both State and General, are but a system of judicious contrivances to bring this fundamental principle into fair, practical operation. Among the most prominent of these is, the responsibility of representatives to their constituents, through frequent periodical elections, in order to enforce a faithful performance of their delegated trust. Without such a check on their powers, however clearly they may be defined and distinctly prescribed, our liberty would be but a mockery. The Government, instead of being directed to the general good, would speedily become but the instrument to aggrandize those who might be intrusted with its administration. … The committee has labored to little purpose, if they have not demonstrated that the very case … does not now exist in our country, under the name of the American System and which, if not timely arrested, must be followed by all the consequences which never fail to spring from the exercise of irresponsible power. On the great and vital point-the industry of the country-which comprehends almost every interest-the interest of the two great sections is opposed. We want free trade, they restrictions; we want moderate taxes, frugality in the Government, economy, accountability, and a rigid application of the public money to the payment of the debt, and to the objects authorized by the Constitution. In all these particulars, if we may judge by experience, their views of their interest are precisely the opposite. They feel and act, on all questions connected with the American System, as sovereigns, as men invariably do who impose burdens on others for their own benefit; and we, on the other band, like those on whom such burdens are imposed. In a word, to the extent stated, the country is divided and organized into two great parties the one sovereign and the other subject-bearing towards each other all the attributes which must ever accompany that relation, under whatever form it may exist….

The committee has demonstrated that the present disordered state of our political system originated in the diversity of interests which exists in the country; a diversity recognized by the Constitution itself, and to which it owes one of its most distinguished and peculiar features, the division of the delegated powers between the State and General Governments. Our short experience, before the formation of the present Government, had conclusively shown that, while there were powers which in their nature were local and peculiar, and which could not be exercised by all, without oppression to some of the parts, so, also, there were those which, in their operation, necessarily affected the whole, and could not, therefore, be exercised by any of the parts, without affecting injuriously the others. On this different character, by which powers are distinguished in their geographical operation, our political system was constructed. Viewed in relation to them, to a certain extent we have a community of interests, which can only be justly and fairly supervised by concentrating the will and authority of the several States in the General Government; while, at the same time, the States have distinct and separate interests, over which no supervision can be exercised by the general power without injustice and oppression. Hence the division in the exercise of sovereign powers. In drawing the line between the powers of the two-the General and State Governments-the great difficulty consisted in determining correctly to which of the two the various political powers ought to belong. This difficult task was, however, performed with so much success that, to this day, there is an almost entire acquiescence in the correctness with which the line was drawn. It would be extraordinary if a system, thus resting with such profound wisdom on the diversity of geographical interests among the States, should make no provision against the dangers to which its very basis might be exposed. The framers of our Constitution have not exposed themselves to the imputation of such weakness. When their work is fairly examined, it will be found that they have provided, with admirable skill, the most effective remedy; and that, if it has not prevented the danger with which the system is now threatened, the fault is not theirs, but ours, in neglecting to make its proper application. In the primary division of the sovereign powers, and in their exact and just classification, as stated, are to be found the first provisions or checks against the abuse of authority on the part of the absolute majority. The powers of the General Government are particularly enumerated and specifically delegated; and all powers not expressly delegated, or which are not necessary and proper to carry into effect those that are so granted, are reserved expressly to the States or the people. The Government is thus positively restricted to the exercise of those general powers that were supposed to act uniformly on all the parts, leaving, the residue to the people of the States, by whom alone, from the very nature of these powers, they can be justly and fairly exercised, as has been stated.

Our system, then, consists of two distinct and independent Governments. The general powers, expressly delegated to the General Government, are subject to its sole and separate control; and the States cannot, without violating the constitutional compact, interpose their authority to check, or in any manner to counteract its movements, so long as they are confined to the proper sphere. So, also, the peculiar and local powers reserved to the States are subject to their exclusive control; nor can the General Government interfere, in any manner, with them, without violating the Constitution.

In order to have a full and clear conception of our institutions, it will be proper to remark that there is, in our system, a striking distinction between Government and Sovereignty. The separate governments of the several States are vested in their Legislative, Executive, and judicial Departments; while the sovereignty resides in the people of the States respectively. The powers of the General Government are also vested in its Legislative, Executive, and judicial Departments, while the sovereignty resides in the people of the several States who created it, But, by an express provision of the Constitution, it may be amended or changed by three fourths of the States; and thus each State, by assenting to the Constitution with this provision, has modified its original right as a sovereign, of making its individual consent necessary to any change in its political condition; and, by becoming a member of the Union, has placed this important power in the hands of three fourths of the States, -in whom the highest power known to the Constitution actually resides. Not the least portion of this high sovereign authority resides in Congress, or any of the departments of the General Government. They are but the creatures of the Constitution, and are appointed but to execute its provisions; and, therefore, any attempt by all, or any of these departments, to exercise any power which, in its consequences, may alter the nature of the instrument, or change the condition of the parties to it, would be an act of usurpation….

It is thus that our system has provided appropriate checks between the Departments, a veto to guard the supremacy of the Constitution over the laws, and to preserve the due importance of the States, considered in reference to large and small, without creating discord or weakening the beneficent energy of the Government. And so, also, in the division of the sovereign authority between the General and State Governments, by leaving to the States an efficient power to protect, by a veto, the minor against the major interests of the community, the framers of the Constitution acted in strict conformity with the principle which invariably prevails throughout the whole system, where separate interests exist. They were, in truth, no ordinary men. They were wise and practical statesmen, enlightened by history and their own enlarged experience, acquired in conducting our country through a most important revolution; and understood profoundly the nature of man and of government. They saw and felt that there existed in our nature the necessity of government, and government of adequate powers; that the selfish predominate over the social feelings; and that, without a government of such powers, universal conflict and anarchy must prevail among the component parts of society; but they also clearly saw that, our nature remaining unchanged by change of condition, unchecked power, from this very predominance of the selfish over the social feelings, which rendered government necessary, would, of necessity, lead to corruption and oppression on the part of those vested with its exercise. Thus the necessity of government and of checks originates in the same great principle of our nature; and thus the very selfishness which impels those who have power to desire more, will also, with equal force, impel those on whom power operates to resist aggression; and on the balance of these opposing tendencies, liberty and happiness must for ever depend. This great principle guided in the formation of every part of our political system. There is not one opposing interest throughout the whole that is not counterpoised. Have the rulers a separate interest from the people? To check its abuse, the relation of representative and constituent is created between them, through periodical elections, by which the fidelity of the representative to the constituent is secured. Have the States, as members of the Union, distinct political interests in reference to their magnitude? Their relative weight is carefully settled, and each has its appropriate agent, with a veto on each other, to protect its political consequence. May there be a conflict between the Constitution and the laws, whereby the rights of citizens may be affected? A remedy may be found in the power of the courts to declare the law unconstitutional in such cases as may be brought before them. Are there, among the several States, separate and peculiar geographical interests? To meet this, a particular organization is provided in the division of the sovereign powers between the State and General Governments. Is there danger, growing out of this division, that the State Legislatures may encroach on the powers of the General Government? The authority of the Supreme Court is adequate to check such encroachments. May the General Government, on the other hand, encroach on the rights reserved to the States respectively? To the States respectively each in its sovereign capacity is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of interposition, to arrest the encroachment. And, finally, may this power be abused by a State, so as to interfere improperly with the powers delegated to the General Government? There is provided a power, even over the Constitution itself, vested in three fourths of the States, which Congress has the authority to invoke, and may terminate all controversies in reference to the subject, by granting or withholding the right in contest. Its authority is acknowledged by all; and to deny or resist it, would be, on the part of the State, a violation of the constitutional compact, and a dissolution of the political association, as far as it is concerned. This is the ultimate and highest power, and the basis on which the whole system rests….

Review items for midterm

Encomienda/ Black Legend/ Treaty of Tordesillas/ impact of Crusades
Columbian Exchange and impact worldwide – food and microbes
Impact of New World gold on Old World economy/ capitalism
early exploration- differences between Spanish, French, English; Treaty of Tordesillas; impact on Native peoples
Impact of horses, weapons, and trade goods on Native Peoples
Iroquois Confederacy/Powhatan’s Confederation/ Handsome Lake/ Tecumseh
Jamestown vs, Massachusetts similarities and differences
Pilgrims and Puritans- beliefs and differences/ Model of Christian Charity/ Virginia Company
Labor- indentured servitude/ slavery/ immigration/ early industrialization/ headright system
Egalitarianism vs. class structure/ women’s rights/
Family structure differences between Jamestown and Massachusetts
Reasons for settling of early colonies/ Carolinas/ New York/ Maryland/ Pennsylvania/ Georgia, etc
Anne Hutchinson, Roger Williams and Rhode Island, Quakers
Salem Witch Trials
Half-way Covenant- reasons for implementation, effect of compromise
Early agriculture by region/ tobacco/ cotton /cotton gin/ westward settlement
Women’s sphere
Religion- influence on settlement, establishment, religious dissent, Connecticut Blue Laws, Act of Toleration, main denominations
Most populous/ wealthy colonies/ politically powerful
Attempts at Unity/ problem of disunity
Economic and democratic features of Constitution/ demigods/ Charles Beard
Early governments: Mayflower Compact, Fundamental Orders, House of Burgesses, town meetings, voting requirements, state constitutions
New England Confederation/ Dominion of New England- differences, reasons for establishment
Benign neglect/ Navigation laws/ Mercantilism
Natural rights/ rights of Englishmen/ common law/ feme covert/ Zenger case
French and Indian War- causes, personages, impact on relation with England
Albany Congress
Proclamation of 1763
Early agriculture by region/ tobacco/ cotton /cotton gin/ westward settlement
Reasons for American Revolution/ Intolerable Acts/ taxation policy
Patrick Henry/ Samuel Adams/ John Adams/ Benedict Arnold
Republicanism/ Common Sense
Land Ordinance 1785/ Northwest Ordinance 1787
Concept of sovereignty
Founding Fathers and slavery
Native people in French and Indian War and Revolution
Triangular trade—goods and seaports
1st Great Awakening- causes, impacts major figures
Jeffersonian/ Hamiltonian disagreements
beginning of political parties- issues, leaders, beliefs
Articles of Confederation-accomplishments, weaknesses
Republican Motherhood/ runaway wives
Impact of Revolution on Slavery
Philosophical foundations of Revolution and Constitution
Main features of Constitution- enumerated powers, function of different branches of govt., Bill of Rights, fundamental law, Electoral College, elastic clause, necessary and proper, advise and consent, implied powers, habeas corpus
Interpretation of Constitution: strict-loose interpretation/Compact theory/ doctrine of nullification/ attempts at secession, Va. and Ky. Resolutions
Alien and Sedition Acts
Rebellions: Shays’, Whiskey, Bacon’s, slave uprisings, Regulators, Paxton Boys and impacts
Compromises in Constitution and impacts
Relations with France and England during the early Republic/ Franco-American treaty/ Embargo Act/ Macon’s Bill No. 2
Major Treaties: Peace of Paris, Ghent, Greenville, Jay, Pinckney,
Basic beliefs of Whig party
Precedents of Washington’s presidency
Creation of Market economy/ early industrialization
John Marshall’s influence, main cases, and beliefs/ judicial review
Tariffs and protests- Hamilton’s financial plan, 1816, 1824, 1828, SC Exposition
Transportation-infrastructure/American System/ Canals, steamboats/ Cumberland Road/ right of deposit
Jeffersonian Democracy/ Common man/ natural aristocracy
Debtor vs. Creditor/ currency issues
1st and 2nd Bank of the US
Empire for Liberty/ yeoman farmer/ Louisiana Purchase/ Jefferson’s dilemma
Westward expansion and Mississippi River/ Indian Removal
Lewis and Clark/ Corps of Discovery
War of 1812—Causes/Frontier/Impressment/ 2nd War of Independence/ Star Spangled Banner
Nationalism/ sectionalism- tension
Era of Good Feelings
Rise of Andrew Jackson
Jacksonian Democracy
Major documents

Review of the Jacksonian period

Starts with John Quincy Adams and goes through the growth of Jacksonian democracy. Once again, this is just the first part of Mr. Wallace’s review. Follow the links to the rest after you finish part I.

An Explanation of the Judiciary Act of 1801

An Explanation of the Judiciary Act of 1801

The Judiciary Act of 1801: “An Act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States.”
2 Stat. 89.
February 13, 1801.

Within twelve years of the establishment of the federal judiciary, Congress approved a sweeping reorganization of the nation’s court system and significantly expanded federal jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1801 reduced the size of the Supreme Court from six justices to five and eliminated the justices’ circuit duties. To replace the justices on circuit, the act created sixteen judgeships for six judicial circuits. The U.S. circuit courts over which the new judges were to preside gained jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution and acts of the United States. The requirements for diversity suits (cases involving parties from different states) made it easier for creditors to recover debts in federal courts. In many cases, most importantly those involving land, restrictions on jurisdictional amounts were removed. In other cases jurisdictional amounts were reduced and the transfer of cases from state courts made easier. The division of states to create additional circuit and district courts further encouraged citizens to rely on the federal rather than state courts.

The reorganization of the federal judiciary was in part a response to calls for reform of the justices’ circuit court obligations. As early as 1790 the attorney general, concerned that justices could rule on appeals of cases they decided in trial court, recommended the end of circuit riding. A 1793 act reducing from two to one the number of justices required for a circuit court did little to quiet the justices’ complaints about the burdens of time and travel. The scope of the Judiciary Act of 1801, however, went beyond any specific revision of the judicial system and represented the triumph of those who advocated a dominant national judiciary rather than the compromise of 1789 which left the state courts with a significant share of federal jurisdiction.

Congressional debate on the bill reflected the bitter conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans. Federalists insisted that the increase in the number of judges and the establishment of more courts were necessary to protect the federal government against hostile state governments and “the corrupters of public opinion.” Republicans interpreted the act as an attempt to weaken the state governments and secure patronage positions for Federalists. Republicans also feared the expanded jurisdiction of the same courts in which their supporters had been prosecuted under the Alien and Sedition Acts. Although a version of the bill had been introduced before the elections of 1800, John Adams signed the act into law on February 13, 1801, less than three weeks before the end of his term and that of the Federalist majority in the Sixth Congress.

The partisan character and the timing of the act provoked immediate opposition to the new organization of the judiciary. The hastily confirmed appointees to the circuit courts earned the label “Midnight Judges” as Jeffersonian Republicans accused the Federalists of packing the courts following their defeat in the elections of 1800. The newly-elected president, Thomas Jefferson, and the Republican majority in the Seventh Congress came into office intent on repeal.

From this website.

Outline format chapter 13 on Jacksonian Democracy

These are due on Monday, October 9. Make sure you explain the historical significance of items.

Do NOT simply print these out a scribble a few words around the prompts– you will receive no credit unless you actually use this as a framework for your own notes!

I. How– and why– did American politics move away from its fear of the masses and embrace an new paradigm in which the “common man” was empowered?

Compare and contrast Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democracy

Explain “universal white manhood suffrage”

Why do property requirements for voters become meaningless?

Economic stresses

Missouri Compromise awakens the people

The “Corrupt Bargain” and its effects

II. Poor John Quincy Adams– doomed from the start?

Was Jackson cheated?

Elected as a “minority” president

Out of touch with the people?

Miscalculations with the Tariff of 1828– an “Abomination?”

South Carolina “Exposition” and John C. Calhoun– The beginning of South Carolina causing lots of trouble

Southern complaints abut tariffs– and is nullification the answer?

“Revolution” of 1828

III. What is the significance of the presidency of Andrew Jackson?

Is Jackson a thug? Or just a “man of the people?”

Mudslinging in the campaign sets a precedent

Spoils system and “rotation in office”

Cabinet troubles– the Eaton affair
Why was Jackson so touchy about the subject?

IV. Sectionalism and Political Wrangling
What was the real cause of trouble between Jackson and Calhoun?

Webster-Hayne debates– what were they about? Nationalism v. sectionalism

Was Jackson a states’ rights man, or a federalist? The nullification crisis– and how Jackson handles it may surprise you

Limits of federal power: the BUS Controversy

Election of 1832: Jackson, Clay– and Biddle?
“pet banks”

Indian Removal: The Five Civilized Tribes and the Trail of Tears

Texas Revolution and Independence– Why didn’t we just help them out?

V. Election of the “Little Magician”

The Whig Party– why does it come into being, and what are its principles?
What do the Whigs disagree with the Jacksonians about?
What do they have in common?

Panics and Depressions– why?

The Divorce Bill and the BUS

Election of Harrison– How does he pull it off?